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••
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••

••

••
••
••
••
••

Defendants-Respondents.

••

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
In this action, plaintiff seeks to obtain unemployment
compensation benefits under the Utah Employment Security Act,
1
§ 35-4-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
DISPOSITION IN ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
On August 6, 1981, 2 plaintiff was prevented by his
employer from reporting to work and was advised his termination
was in progress.

Plaintiff was officially terminated from his

job as an air traffic controller at the Salt Lake International

1 Hereinafter, reference to the Utah Code Annotated
will be by •u.c.A.•, followed by designation of the appropriate
section thereof.
2
indicated.

All

dates

herein

are

-1-

in

1981

unless
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otherwise

Airport

effective

September

15.

On

August

applied for unemployment insurance benefits.

27,

on September 18,

plaintiff's application was denied under u.c.A.
and (d).
Appeal

On October 13, plaintiff appealed.

Referee,

Stanley

H.

plaintiff's application for
and

(d).

U.C.A.

Griffin,

plaintiff

s

35-4-5(b)(l)

on December 30,

affirmed

the

denial

benefits under U.C.A.

of

S 35-4-5(a)

The appeal referee did not rely in any part upon
35-4-5(b)(l) in so ruling.

§

On January 8, 1982, plain-

tiff appealed Referee Griffin's decision to the Board of Review
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment
Security

(hereinafter the •Board of Review•).

In a decision

dated February 16, 1982, the Board of Review (member Richard H.
Schone

separately

decision.

concurring)

Pursuant to U.C.A.

affirmed
§

the

Appeal

Referee's

35-4-lO(i), plaintiff filed his

Petition for Writ of Review herein on March 15, 1982.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board
of

Review

affirming

plaintiff.

the

denial

of

unemployment

benefits

to

Plaintiff asks the Court to grant him unemployment

benefits and award him costs and attorney's fees
his appeals.

-2-
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incurred in

STATEMENT OF FACTS 3
From
employed

by

February
the

1974

Federal

to

August

1981,

plaintiff

Aviation Administration

•FAA•) as an air traffic controller

(R. 0040).

plaintiff was

Lake

Center.

working

at

the

Salt

Air

was

(hereinafter
As of August

Traffic

Control

On or about August 3, a nationwide air traffic con-

trollers' strike commenced.
stated in the Record,

While this fact

it is acknowledged by plaintiff that a

strike commenced on August 3.

Plaintiff failed to report for

work on August 3, 4 and 5 (R. 0041).
President Reagan's

is not expressly

•amnesty period•,

Under the guidelines of
air

traffic

controllers

had until their first scheduled shift after 11:00 a.m. Eastern
Standard Time,
0042-0043).

August 5,

within which to report to work

(R.

Plaintiff's first scheduled shift after the dead-

line was 8:00 a.m. on August 6 (R. 0042-0043).

There is a dis-

crepancy in the record as to the events of August 6, concerning
plaintiff's attempts to return to work.

It is the testimony of

Clyde Denham, chief of the traffic control tower at the Salt
Lake International Airport, that plaintiff talked to Warren

3 References to the Record on Appeal will be designated •R• followed by the respective page number of the
Record.
There is some confusion in that part of the record
comprised of the transcript of plaintiff's hearing before the
Appeal Referee, where names of the people testifying were
mis-designated.
To correct this problem and to alleviate confusion, the page numbers of the Record will be given and the
correct individuals speaking will be named.
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Lee (deputy chief of the Salt Lake tower) a few times on the
morning of August 6, prior to plaintiff's individual deadline,
and was advised as to the time in which he had to
report under

the

•amnesty period•.

Denham testified further

that Lee recorded in a telephone log certain remarks by plaintiff to the effect that he could not report for work immediately because he had •made a promise to a particular individual
or group of individuals.
would

be

violating my

I

oath

cannot come out there because I
to

them•.

Warren

Lee

did

not

testify and the telephone log was not introduced into evidence
(R. 0045).

Plaintiff's testimony of the events of August 6 was

as follows:

plaintiff called Lee at the Salt Lake tower at

about 7:00 a.m. on August 6, and was informed by Lee that his
deadline to report to work was at 8:00 a.m.

(R. 0047). Until

this conversation, plaintiff had received no official notification

or

any

telegrams

informing

him

of

President

Reagan's

•amnesty period• or how the •amnesty period• applied to him (R.
0041).

Plaintiff further testified without contradiction that

Denham and Lee gave him an extension to his deadline of •about
an hour•

(R.

0047).

At about 9:00 or 9:15 a.m., on August 6,

plaintiff told Lee that he was prepared to report for duty and
Lee

said

that

that was

•[F]ine•

(R.

0047).

Lee

then

gave

plaintiff detailed instructions for gaining access to the control tower.

In this regard, Lee advised plaintiff that he was

to report to the National Guard unit located at the airport,

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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give his name and show some kind of identification (R. 0047).
He would then go through a checkpoint and be transported by the
National

Guard

across

the

air

field

to

the

control

tower.

Plaintiff was very concerned about this procedure because he
had heard rumors that there were armed guards at the checkpoint
(R. 0047) and he knew thaf there were pickets stationed at the
entrance to the National Guard checkpoint (R. 0049).
denies

that

he

because of an

told

Lee

•oath.•

that

On

this

he

would

not

subject,

Plaintiff

report

plaintiff

to

work

testified

that because of his physical condition he could not endure the
reporting procedure described by Lee--• I
like that at this time•
cal

condition,

(R.

plaintiff

0047-0048).
testified

cannot do something
Concerning his physi-

that

he

had

suffered

anxiety, insomnia and other disorders since the last few days
of July 1981 (R. 0041-0042).

As revealed by a letter from Dr.

David A. Schein, M.D., Ph.D. (R. 0064), plaintiff was seen and
treated on August 7, with follow-up consul tat ions thereafter.
Plaintiff's stress-induced emotional and physiological disturbances were treated with Valium

(R.

0042,

0064).

The factors

which caused plaintiff this stress are outlined in plaintiff's
written response to the FAA's notice to plaintiff of its intent
to

terminate

him

(R.

0062-0063).

In

addition,

during

his

testimony before the Appeal Referee plaintiff specifically
•
recalled threats of reprisals that he had heard (R. 0048-0049).
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Following his conversation with Lee and Denham on the
morning of August 6,
Bureau

of

plaintiff was contacted by the Federal

Investigation
a

and

effect

(R.

and

This •1iterally scared the hell out of• plaintiff

time (R. 0049).

in

Justice

0048).

to work (R. 0041, 0049).

was

of

that

approxirnate~y

order

Department

advised

0041) and, at

restraining

the

0041,
(R.

11:30 p.m., August 6, he reported

There were no pickets present at this

When plaintiff reported to work he was advised

by the deputy chief on duty •that an intent to terminate was in
progress• and that he should leave the facility immediately (R.
0041).

Denham

On August 9,

plaintiff received a letter from Clyde

0065-0066)

stating that it was the intent of Mr.

(R.

Denham to remove plaintiff from his job as air traffic control
specialist.

Plaintiff responded to Mr. Denham's letter with an

August 19 letter setting forth his reasons for
for work until 11:30 p.m., August 6.

(R.

not reporting

0062-0063).

Plain-

tiff also orally presented his position to Mr. Denham on August
19.

Thereafter, plaintiff received .a letter from Mr. Denham,

dated September 8, terminating him as an air traffic control
specialist effective September 15 (R. 0056).
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ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF DID NOT VOLUNTARILY LEAVE WORK WITHOUT
GOOD CAUSE AND, THEREFORE, IS ELIGIBLE FOR
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS.
U.C.A.

§

35-4-S(a) states that an individual will not

be eligible for benefits tf the claimant •1eft work voluntarily
without good cause.•

This disqualification is subject to the

proviso
that no claimant shall be ineligible for
benefits if the claimant leaves work under
circumstances of such a nature that it would
be contrary to equity and good conscience to
impose a disqualification.
In addition to this proviso, the statute directs the
Industrial Commission to
consider for the purposes of this act, the
reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence
a genuine continuing attachment to the labor
market
in
reaching
a
determination
of
whether the ineligibility of a claimant is
contrary to equity and good conscience.
In

determining

whether

unemployment benefits under U.C.A.
to

analyze

statute.
analysis:

and

To

do

apply
this,

the

plaintiff
§

ineligible

for

35-4-S(a), it is necessary

above-noted

plaintiff

is

has

provisions

employed

the

of

the

following

(I) was plaintiff terminated or did he voluntarily

leave work within the meaning of the statute?

(II)

Assuming

that plaintiff voluntarily left work, what was the extent of
his leaving work (i.e., did he quit), and do the facts estab-
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lish good cause for such leaving?

In evaluating the issue of

good cause (i.e., defined by the statute as circumstances under
which a disqualification would be contrary to equity and good
conscience), plaintiff has, pursuant to the provisions of the
statute,

included herein a discussion concerning the reason.•

ableness of plaintiff's actions (under the circumstances), and
the extent to which those actions evidenced a •genuine continuing attachment• to the labor market.
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF WAS TERMINATED.
As established

in the Statement of Facts,

plaintiff

did not know of the time by which he could report to work until
he was advised by warren Lee at approximately 7: 00
August 6, that he had until 8:00 a.m. that day.

a.m.

on

During a sub-

sequent conversation with Lee, plaintiff was given an extension
of this deadline of approximately one hour.

At about 9:00 a.m.

or 9:15 a.rn. on August 6, plaintiff told Lee that he was prepared

to

report

to

However,

work.

Lee

stated

that

this

would

be

when Lee told plaintiff of the procedure

which had to be followed in order to report, plaintiff realized
that he could not physically or emotionally handle the procedure,

which

procedure

involved

between armed guards and pickets.

potential

As candidly stated by plain-

tiff,
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

confrontation

•it scared the hell out of me. I, I, all I
wanted to do was be a neutral party, get the
(?) to work, get my paycheck, get the hell
out. I don't want to be caught in them wars ·
there.• (R. 0048)
some time later that day, plaintiff was advised by the FBI and
the

Department

effect.

of

Justice

that

a

restraining

order

was

in

This •literally scared the hell out of• plaintiff, and

he reported to work at about 11:30 p.m.
pickets were present.

that night, when no

Upon reporting to work, plaintiff was

told to leave because an intent to terminate was in progress.
Thereafter,

plaintiff received a notice

from the FAA, dated August 9.

of

intent

to

remove

Al though plaintiff submitted a

written and verbal response to this notice, he was terminated
effective September 15 (R. 0056).
These

facts

simply do

not

establish

that

plaintiff

voluntarily left work in the sense that he •quit• so as to be
disqualified from receiving benefits for the period after his
attempt to report to work.

On the contrary, the facts reveal

that for the first days of the strike plaintiff was emotionally
and physically incapable of reporting to work.

When plaintiff

finally was able to agree to report to work on the morning of
August 6, he was immediately confronted with a reporting procedure

fraught

with

guards and pickets.

potential
Initially,

confrontation

between

armed

plaintiff was physically and

emotionally unprepared and unable to cope with this procedure.
However,

following contact by the FBI and the Department of
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Justice,

plaintiff was able to pull himself together

reported to work.

and he

Certainly, plaintiff did not feel or believe

that he had •quit• work and the actions of the FAA belie any
such conclusion, in that they sent plaintiff a letter of intent
to

remove,

responses
notice.

solicited

from

and

considered

plaintiff: and

sent

verbal

plaintiff

and
a

written

termination

At no time has the FAA ever asserted that plaintiff

quit his job.
At most, it could be argued (but it is not conceded by
plaintiff) that under these circumstances plaintiff should be
disqualified for the period August 3 through 11:30 p.m. August
6 under the theory that during this period he left work voluntarily without good cause.

However, the facts cannot support

the finding that by reporting late, plaintiff permanently and
irrevocably quit his employment so as to justify a disqualification under U.C.A.
11:30 p.m. August 6.
for purposes of
work late.
1 ishes

an

§

S 35-4-5(a)

for

the period on and after

What is meant by voluntarily leaving work

35-4-5(a) is something more than reporting to

It means an act,

such as retiring, which estab-

intent to permanently cease work.

Board of Review of Industrial Commission,

~'

Denby v.

567 P.2d 626

(Ut.

1977).
What the Appeal Referee and the Board of Review have
done by their rulings is to seize upon u.c.A. § 35-4-S(a) and
apply it to a situation that legally and factually amounts to a

-10-
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termination, which, as recognized by Tom L. Brant in his decision of September 18
provisions of U.C.A.

(R.
§

0054), must be evaluated under the

35-4-5(b)(l).

When examined under this

later section, plaintiff's post-August 6 disqualification cannot be sustained.

Thus, under the circumstances of this case,
·~

plaintiff's conduct does not, as a matter of law, rise to the
level of conduct which

is

•deliberate, wilful or wanton and

adverse to the employer's rightful
this section of the statute.

~'

interest•,

as required by

Continental Oil Company v.

Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 568 P.2d
727 (Ut. 1977).

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF HAD GOOD CAUSE FOR REPORTING TO WORK LATE.
Even assuming that U.C.A. S 35-4-5(a) applies (because
plaintiff

•1eft

work

voluntarily•

when

he

reported

to

work

beyond his deadline as extended by Lee on the morning of August
6),

the undisputed facts establish that there was good cause

for this delay in reporting.
The only recent Utah Supreme Court case dealing with
U.C.A.

§

35-4-5(a),

the

Employment security Act,

•voluntary quit• section of the Utah
is Denby v.

Board of Review of the

Industrial Commission of Utah, 567 P.2d 626 (Ut. 1977).
the

facts

of

Denby

are

quite

different

from

those

While
of

the

instant case, the statements of the court on the standard of
•good cause•

are applicable.

In Denby the plaintiff volun-
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tarily retired from the United States Postal service in order
to move to his brother's ranch

in Montana.

unemployment insurance benefits.

Be

applied

for

His application was denied,

in part, on grounds not applicable in the instant case, i.e.,
because he did not make a reasonable and active attempt to find
work,

as

affirming
§

required
the

by

finding

U;C.A.
of

S 35-4-4(c).

In

disqualification

addition
under

to

U.C.A.

35-4-4(c), the Supreme Court upheld Denby's disqualification

for a four-week period under U.C.A. S 35-4-S(a), on the ground
that Denby left work voluntarily, without good cause.

In so

holding, the Court affirmed the appeal referee's decision that
Denby' s asserted reasons for

retiring

(that he suffered from

arthritis and mental stress and that mandatory overtime was a
contributing factor) did not amount to •compelling reasons• for
his retirement.

The Court went on to explain that the question

of •good cause• for voluntarily leaving employment is a question of law and fact for the administrative agency.

Citing two

Oregon cases, the Court said that •good cause• is
such cause as would similarly affect persons
of reasonable and normal sensitivity, and is
limited to those instances where the unemployment is caused by external pressures so
compelling that a reasonably prudent person,
exercising ordinary common sense and prudence, would be justified in quitting under
similar circumstances.
Denby v.

Board of Review of Industrial Commission,

626, 630 (Ut. 1977).

-12-
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567 P. 2d

In evaluating the issue of good cause in this case, it
is critical to bear in mind that the act of plaintiff to be
examined is his failure to report to work during the period
from approximately 9:15 a.m. to 11:30 p.m. on August 6, and not
his failure

to report to work on August 3,

4,

or

5.

This

follows since those controllers who missed all or part of these
latter

days,

but

then

returned

to

work

within

President

Reagan's •amnesty period•, were not penalized in any manner for
having missed work on these days.
As set forth under Point I above,

plaintiff did not

intend to voluntarily quit his job when he delayed reporting
for work on August 6.

All the facts of this case compel the

conclusion that plaintiff desired to keep his
plaintiff was

subjected

to

the

following

job.

However,

external

pressures

which caused him emotional and physical problems, resulting in
his delay in reporting to work:
1.

statements by union officials that those who

reported to work would be •taken care of• -( R.

0049,

0062-0063);
2.

information that those who were working were

being harassed (R. 0062-0063);
3.

misrepresentations by union officials as to

what would be done by the FAA to those who returned to
work (R. 0062-0063);

-13-
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4.

unclear/confusing information concerning the

President's

amnesty

period

and

how

it

applied

to

plaintiff (R. 0062-0063);
5.

a reporting procedure that allowed for

the

possibility of potential violence (i.e., armed guards
confronting pickets).
On their face, items 1 and 2 above may not appear compelling.

However, as shown in the case of Anthan v. PATCO, 521

F.Supp. 1 (E.D. Mo. 1981), due to the high degree of cooperation and assistance which is required between air traffic controllers, a controller who is shunned by other controllers can
be placed in a life-endangering situation and prevented from
effectively performing his

job.

In Anthan,

supra,

the court

awarded the plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages as a
result of the work-related outrageous

conduct

of

his

fellow

controllers.
In examining the question of good cause, determining
the intent of the Legislature is very important.

As observed

in Denby, supra at 630:
The Legislature contemplated that when an
individual voluntarily leaves a job under
the pressure of circumstances which may
reasonably be viewed as having compelled him
to do so, the termination of his employment
is involuntary for purposes of this act.
Furthermore,

the

lack

of

findings

of

fact

by

the

appeal referee and the Board of Review on the above circumstances compels the conclusion that they did not consider the
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equity and good conscience provisions of u.c.A.
These

~revisions

s

35-4-S(a).

require the Industrial Commission to examine

whether, under the circumstances of the individual case, plaintiff's actions were reasonable and evidenced •a genuine continuing attachment to the

labor market.

••

•

•

Based upon

these circumstances, the Commission must then decide whether a
disqualification is contrary to equity and good conscience.
The circumstances cited above may not have
plaintiff

in

permanently

leaving

his

work.

justified

However,

these

factors are sufficiently compelling within the definition of
the phrase •good cause• as defined in Denby, supra, to justify
plaintiff's delay in reporting to work for several hours past
his deadline.
CONCLUSION
The

undisputed

facts,

including

those

found

by

the

appeal referee and the Board of Review and those appearing as
undisputed

in

the Record,

establish

that

the

action of

the

Board of Review was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable in
disqualifying

plaintiff

for

benefits

after

he

attempted

to

report to work several hours after the expiration of his •deadline•

on

August

6.

As

opinion of Board member,

openly

revealed

Richard H.

by

Schone,

the

concurring

the decision in

plaintiff's case was not a decision on the individual facts of
plaintiff's case, but rather, a decision on the overall issue
of the air traffic controllers' strike.

There is no evidence
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in the record to show that plaintiff engaged in or supported
the strike.

On the contrary,

the evidence establishes

that

plaintiff wanted to work and attempted to do so as best he
could

under

the

circumstances.

Furthermore,

the

issue

of

whether the FAA had good or legal cause to terminate plaintiff
or other air traffic controllers should not have been the question before

the

Board of Review.

Rather,

the question was

whether plaintiff, under the facts of his individual case, was
entitled

to

receive

unemployment

Employment security Act.

benefits

under

the

Utah

Under the facts of this case, plain-

tiff is entitled to such benefits for the period following his
attempt to return to work on August 6.
DATED this 24th day of June, 1982.
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